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The impact of three types of everyday activities (i.e., social, experiential, and developmental) on four cognitive
functions (i.e., immediate recall, learning, fluid intelligence, and information-processing speed) and one global in-
dicator of cognitive functioning (Mini-Mental State Exam score) over a period of 6 years was studied in a large
55–85 year-old population-based sample (
 
N
 
 
 

 
 2,076). A cross-lagged regression model with latent variables was
applied to each combination of 1 cognitive function and 1 type of activity, resulting in 15 (3 
 

 
 5) different models.
None of the activities were found to enhance cognitive functioning 6 years later when controlling for age, gender,
level of education, and health, as well as for unknown confounding variables. Conversely, one cognitive function
(i.e., information-processing speed) appeared to affect developmental activity. It is suggested that no specific ac-
tivity, but rather socioeconomic status to which activities are closely connected, contributes to maintenance of
cognitive functions.
 
ESEARCHERS in the field of cognitive aging agree
that, on average, cognitive functioning declines with
aging. Cognitive decline may begin after midlife, but most
often occurs at higher ages (70 or higher). However, major
individual differences in rate and onset of decline are ob-
served (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Schaie, 1980, 1983). More-
over, maintenance or even improvement of cognitive func-
tioning with aging is found among some persons (Baltes,
Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1986; Korten et al., 1997). Cog-
nitive decline is associated with increased personal discom-
fort, loss of autonomy, and increasing societal costs. Re-
search on factors affecting cognitive performance may
therefore contribute to the design of intervention strategies
that can improve the autonomy and well-being of the aging
population.
Over the last decades, increasing evidence has been pro-
vided for the beneficial effects of contextual variables sug-
gesting possible points of contact for intervention strategies.
Leading an active life is suggested to enhance cognitive
functioning (Schaie, 1983). This relation is explained by the
use of cognitive skills needed to perform activities, espe-
cially activities that are cognitively demanding, resulting in
maintenance or enhancement of cognitive functioning. Sev-
eral studies are consistent with this idea (Arbuckle, Gold, &
Andres, 1986; Fabrigoule et al., 1995; Hultsch, Hammer, &
Small, 1993; Smits, Van Rijsselt, Jonker, & Deeg, 1995).
Apart from these cross-sectional studies in which conclu-
sions on causality are limited, a longitudinal study con-
ducted by Gold and colleagues (1995) revealed that being
active is related to maintenance of intelligence across 40
years.
Recently, Hultsch, Small, Hertzog, and Dixon (1999)
contested the supposed beneficial effect of contextual vari-
ables on cognitive functioning. Using longitudinal data col-
lected among 250 middle-aged and older adults, they in-
vestigated whether participation in cognitively demanding
activities promotes the development and maintenance of
cognitive abilities or whether cognitively capable people
tend to participate in environments that are cognitively de-
manding. Both directions of causation were supported by
the data. Hultsch and colleagues also demonstrated this re-
versed causality in the data set used by Gold and colleagues
(1995). This finding led to a lively discussion between the
two groups of researchers (Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon,
1999; Pushkar et al., 1999). The discussion focused on the
selection of indicators of an active lifestyle, some method-
ological differences, and differences in study samples. The
first and second issues constitute the starting point for the
present study, in which we examined the relation between
everyday activities and cognitive functioning in later life.
Regarding the measurement of activities, it is noted that
Gold and colleagues (1995) used socioeconomic status (SES)
as one of the three indicators of an engaged lifestyle,
whereas Hultsch and colleagues (1999) selected a broad
range of everyday activities, including physical activities,
social activities, hobbies, and novel information-processing
activities such as learning a language or playing bridge. We
share the concern expressed by Hultsch and colleagues
(1999) that level of cognitive functioning, which is associ-
ated with SES, moderates the positive relation between en-
gaged lifestyle and cognitive functioning observed by Gold
and colleagues (1995). However, the relation between novel
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information-processing activities and cognitive functioning
observed by Hultsch and colleagues (1999) may be the re-
sult of an unobserved confounding variable such as level of
education. It is not unthinkable that these novel information-
processing activities, which were operationalized by playing
bridge and learning a language, are related to higher levels
of education or SES (Ganzeboom, 1989). Lack of control
for level of education may have resulted in spurious rela-
tions between activity and cognitive performance. A pro-
cedure to deal with confounding variables, even if these
variables are unknown (MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, &
Fabrigar, 1993), could have prevented both studies from
finding spurious relationships.
Another issue is the specification of all possible direc-
tions of causation. In the model used by Gold and col-
leagues (1995), no reversed causal direction was specified,
and hence no reversed causal effect was detected. In con-
trast, Hultsch and colleagues (1999) specified both direc-
tions of causation in two different models. This approach,
however, does not reveal whether these effects could still be
observed when both directions were implied in one model,
or whether one of the two directions was predominant.
In the present study we investigated the extent to which
one of the two possible directions of causation was present,
or even predominant, in a large population-based sample of
older adults, using various types of everyday activities and
cognitive functions. We controlled for the effect of age,
gender, level of education, and health, as well for the con-
founding effect of other, unmeasured, variables.
Our first question deals with the direction of causation
between different types of everyday activities and cognitive
functioning. First the causal effect of activities on cognitive
functioning was tested. In line with previous studies (Fabri-
goule et al., 1995; Gold et al., 1995) we expected positive ef-
fects from everyday activities on cognitive functioning over
time (Hypothesis 1). The positive effect of activities on cog-
nitive functioning may be explained by the process of learn-
ing generalization (Miller, Slomczynski, & Kohn, 1987).
 
Learning generalization
 
 means that knowledge and orienta-
tions acquired in one situation are generalized or transferred
to other situations. For example, people who do intellectu-
ally demanding work come to exercise their intellectual
abilities not only on the job, but also in their nonoccupa-
tional lives.
The idea of learning generalization, however, also pleads
for the opposite direction of causation. Individuals who are
already at a high level of cognitive functioning may prefer
activities that are cognitively demanding. This leads to a
competing Hypothesis 1, stating that respondents with good
cognitive functioning engage in activities that are cogni-
tively demanding. In line with this is the hypothesis of
Hultsch and colleagues (1999), which reads that high-ability
individuals lead intellectually active lives until cognitive
decline in old age limits their activities.
If everyday activities indeed enhance cognitive function-
ing, our second question is whether specific activities differ
in their impact on cognitive performance. Several studies
suggest that specific activities, rather than an activity per
se, affect cognitive functioning. Activities suggested to sig-
nificantly affect cognitive functioning are activities that are
cognitively demanding (Hultsch et al., 1993). In line with
this are studies of Kohn and Schooler (Kohn & Schooler,
1978; Schooler, Mulatu, & Oates, 1999), stating that sub-
stantively complex work improves intellectual functioning.
Finally, Arbuckle, Gold, Andres, Schwartzman, and Chaikel-
son (1992) revealed that activities in which social support is
received results in maintenance of cognitive functioning.
However, a classification of everyday activities into cogni-
tively demanding or socially supportive activities is not
straightforward. Some activities may be both cognitively
demanding and supportive, whereas other activities may
well differ across individuals in the extent to which the ac-
tivity is cognitively demanding or supportive. For example,
some people may visit a chess match as a spectator because
of their interest in chess, whereas others do so to meet their
friends. Lawton (1993) argued that a classification that dis-
criminates best between the universe of possible activities is
one based on the meaning of the activity. Adapting Law-
ton’s classification, we distinguish social, experiential, and
developmental activities. 
 
Social activity
 
 includes three sub-
categories, that is, social interaction, social status, and ser-
vice, such as volunteering. 
 
Experiential activity
 
 is charac-
terized by the intrinsic satisfaction of the activity. It
includes activities that are engaged in to find relaxation, or
relief from social contexts. 
 
Developmental activity
 
, includ-
ing intellectual and creative activities, is meant to help one-
self become something, or change in some way. This type
of activity thus possesses an instrumental component. Ap-
plying the concept of cognitive demand to the categoriza-
tion of Lawton (1993), we expect developmental activity to
best reflect activities that are cognitively demanding, and as
such enhance cognitive performance. Furthermore, social
support is likely to be generated by social activities, hence
we expect social activities to also enhance cognitive func-
tioning. As experiential activity is not necessarily cogni-
tively demanding activity, nor activity in which social sup-
port is received, we do not expect any effect on cognitive
functioning (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, we focused on the extent to which various cogni-
tive functions are enhanced by everyday activities, or
whether everyday activities are enhanced by cognitive func-
tions. On the basis of the speed hypothesis of Salthouse
(1996) and arguments of Hultsch and colleagues (1993), we
expected that information-processing speed would be less
sensitive to everyday activities than memory and various
types of nonverbal intelligence. Furthermore, as the slowing
of information-processing speed precedes decline of higher
order cognitive functions, we expected that whenever the
level of activity is affected by cognitive functioning, it is
most readily seen for information-processing speed (Hy-
pothesis 3).
 
M
 
ETHODS
 
Sample
 
Data were used from the Longitudinal Aging Study Am-
sterdam (LASA), which is a longitudinal, multidisciplinary
research project focusing on autonomy and well-being in
the aging population (Deeg, Knipscheer, & Van Tilburg,
1993). The LASA sample is stratified by age and sex, and
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there was an oversampling of older and male participants at
baseline. The sample is drawn from the population registers
of 11 municipalities in three culturally distinct geographical
areas in The Netherlands. The LASA sample was initially
recruited for the study, “Living arrangements and social
networks of older adults” (LSN; Knipscheer, De Jong
Gierveld, Van Tilburg, & Dykstra, 1995). Since the begin-
ning of the LASA study, three cycles have been conducted
with a time interval of approximately 3 years. The first cycle
took place between October 1992 and March 1993. Of the
3,805 participants in the LSN sample, 3,107 persons aged
55 to 85 years took part in the first (T
 
1
 
) LASA cycle (1992/
1993). Of the 698 LSN respondents who did not participate
in the LASA study, 126 (18%) had died and 134 (19%) were
unable to participate in the study because of severe physical
and/or mental health problems. Furthermore, 394 (56%) re-
fused to be reinterviewed, and 44 (6%) could not be con-
tacted. In the present study we selected data from the first
and third cycles, which yields a 6-year time interval. Of the
3,107 LASA respondents, 2,076 (67% of 3,107) were able
to participate in the third (T
 
3
 
) cycle (1998/1999). Attrition
between T
 
1
 
 and T
 
3
 
 was caused primarily by mortality (761
persons, 24%). Other reasons for attrition were refusal (160
persons, 5%), frailty (81 persons, 3%), and failure to contact
(29 persons, 1%). Attrition, not attributable to mortality, is
associated with low cognitive performance, low level of ev-
eryday activity, high age, being male, and a lower level of
education (all 
 
p
 
s 
 

 
 .001) at the first LASA cycle, resulting
in a selection of respondents who were relatively younger
and more highly educated and active, with relatively good
cognitive performance. Although our sample is clearly a
survival sample, we still had a relatively large proportion
(70%) of respondents with one or more chronic disease sug-
gesting sufficient heterogeneity of general health in the study
sample. Furthermore, the stratified sampling frame and the
sample size guaranteed the inclusion of sufficient men (T
 
1
 
49%; T
 
3
 
 45%), respondents in the highest age category (T
 
1
 
M
 
 
 

 
 70.8, 
 
SD
 
 
 

 
 8.8; T
 
3
 
 
 
M
 
 
 

 
 74.7, 
 
SD
 
 
 

 
 8.3), respondents
with low level of education (T
 
1
 
 
 
M
 
 
 

 
 3.4, 
 
SD
 
 
 

 
 2.0; T
 
3
 
 
 
M
 
 
 

 
3.5, 
 
SD
 
 
 

 
 2.0), and with low levels of activity (see Table 1).
Both at T
 
1
 
 and T
 
3
 
, data on the LASA participants were
collected by means of two face-to-face interviews and one
self-administered questionnaire. With respect to the vari-
ables used in this study, the same instruments were used at
T
 
1
 
 and T
 
3
 
. Measures of fluid intelligence and general cogni-
tive functioning were assessed during the first face-to-face
interview, whereas measures of information-processing speed
and memory were part of the second face-to-face interview,
which took place 2 to 4 weeks after the first interview. At
T
 
3
 
, respondents born between 1931 and 1937 were not in-
cluded in the second face-to-face interview, unless they were
part of a small group participating in a side study (
 
n
 
 
 

 
 124).
As a consequence, the number of respondents (
 
n
 
 
 

 
 1352)
completing the memory test and the information processing
speed test at T
 
3
 
 is smaller than for the fluid intelligence test
and Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE) at T
 
3
 
 (
 
n
 
 
 

 
 1874).
 
Exogenous Variables
 
Baseline scores of age, gender, health, and level of educa-
tion are considered exogenous variables as these are known
to be associated with cognitive performance (Brayne, Gill,
Paykel, Huppert, & O’Connor, 1995; Gribbin, Schaie, &
Parham, 1980; Holland & Rabbitt, 1991; Perlmutter &
Nyquist, 1990). Apart from their potentially confounding
effect on cognitive performance, age and gender were in-
cluded because of their use as sample stratification vari-
ables. Functional ability was used as an indicator of health.
Scores were based on ability to perform three activities:
walking up and down a staircase with 15 steps without hav-
ing to stop, using own or public transportation, and cutting
one’s own toenails (Kriegsman, Deeg, Van Eijk, Penninx,
& Boeke, 1997). The respondents were asked to indicate
whether they had difficulty in performing the activity,
whether they needed help, or whether they were unable to
perform it at all. Functional ability ranged from 0 to 9, with
higher test scores indicating better physical functioning.
The functional ability index has good reliability (Cron-
bach’s 
 

 
 
 

 
 .75 at T
 
1
 
). Level of education was assessed by
asking the respondent for the highest educational course
completed, resulting in a nine-categories variable ranging
from 1 (incomplete elementary education) to 9 (university
education).
 
Endogenous Variables
Everyday activities.—
 
Information was collected on 23
different everyday activities. We first selected those activi-
ties in which at least 4% of the respondents were engaged,
to ensure sufficient variability in the variables. The selected
16 activities were then assigned to the three main categories
of everyday activity—that is, social, experiential, and devel-
opmental activity—by eight colleagues of our research
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables and Test for 
Significant Difference Between Two Points in Time 
 
Mean (
 
SD
 
)
Variable T
 
1
 
T
 
3
 
t z
 
Age
 
a
 
68.7 (8.3)
Gender (% Male)
 
a
 
44.6
Level of education
 
a
 
3.5 (2.0)
Functional ability score
 
a
 
8.5 (1.2)
Cognitive functions
MMSE 27.5 (2.7) 26.9 (3.0) 6.9
Immediate recall 4.6 (1.7) 4.3 (1.9) 5.2
Learning 6.0 (2.6) 6.1 (2.2)
 

 
1.6
Fluid intelligence 18.2 (4.2) 16.0 (6.4) 14.0
Information-processing speed 23.1 (7.6) 21.3 (7.9) 10.9
Social activities (% attending)
Attending church services 30.1 17.8
 

 
7.2
Visiting neighborhood association 9.3 6.5
 

 
2.6
Visiting organizations for helping
elderly and handicapped 5.5 4.7
 

 
.9
Experiential activities (1–7)
Making a trip to the forest, dunes 1.7 (.9) 1.6 (.9) 2.7
Visiting a cultural institution 2.5 (1.4) 2.3 (1.4) 5.9
Visiting a café or restaurant 2.2 (1.4) 2.1 (1.4) 3.9
Developmental activities (% attending)
Attending a course or study 13.1 6.9
 

 
5.2
 
Notes
 
: 
 
n
 
 
 

 
 1126. There is a row-wise deletion of missing variables. MMSE 
 

 
Mini-Mental State Exam.
 
a
 
Means and proportions at T
 
1
 
 presented for respondents still present at T
 
3
 
.
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team. Agreement on assignment (at least six out of eight rat-
ers) was observed for 11 activities, which were used for fur-
ther analyses.
For social activity three out of five social activities show-
ing the highest intercorrelation were selected: visiting church
services (yes/no), visiting neighborhood associations (yes/
no), and visiting meetings of an organization for helping
older adults, neighbors, or handicapped persons (yes/no).
For experiential activity three out of four experiential activ-
ities showing the highest intercorrelation were selected:
making a trip to the forest, dunes, zoo, or entertainment
park; visiting a cultural institution such as a museum, the-
ater, or cinema; and visiting a café or restaurant (all answer
categories ranged from 1 [never] to 7 [every day]). For de-
velopmental activity two different activities were selected:
following an educational course or study during the past 6
months (yes/no), and doing outdoor sports (1 [never] to 7
[every day]). Finally, with the LISREL8 program (Jöreskog
& Sörbom, 1993) we tested whether change in the measure-
ment model of everyday activity could be assumed to be a
true change of everyday activity. This change, also referred
to as alpha change (Golembiewski, Billingsley, & Yeager,
1976), which is the level of change given a constant cali-
brated instrument and conceptual domain, is assumed to be
present when the covariance matrices of the indicators in
the measurement model are equal at T
 
1
 
 and T
 
3
 
. We therefore
performed a two-group analysis for the latent variables ex-
periential, social, and developmental activity, under the as-
sumption of equal covariances at both time points. The
models for experiential activity and social activity revealed
good fitting models, 
 

 
2
 
 (6, 
 
N
 
 
 

 
 1697) 
 

 
 13,35, CFI 
 

 
 .99,
sRMR 
 

 
 .02, RMSEA 
 

 
 .02, and 
 

 
2
 
 (6, 
 
N
 
 
 

 
 1693) 
 

 
 8,81,
CFI 
 

 
 1.00, sRMR 
 

 
 .02, RMSEA 
 

 
 .01, respectively.
However, for the two indicators of developmental activity,
no such model could be found. It was concluded that, al-
though doing outdoor sports and attending educational
courses both were rated as indicators of a developmental ac-
tivity, their content was too different to represent a homoge-
neous dimension. As attending educational courses best re-
flects the idea of a cognitively demanding activity, we
selected studying as a single indicator of developmental ac-
tivity.
 
Cognitive functioning.—
 
The cognitive functions in-
volved in this study were those commonly found to deterio-
rate with aging—that is, immediate recall and learning—as
indicators of memory performance, fluid intelligence, and
information-processing speed. They reflect broadly the cog-
nitive functions currently distinguished in the cognitive ag-
ing literature (Baltes, 1993; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997).
For comparative reasons we further included the MMSE
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), because of its wide-
spread use as a screening instrument for cognitive func-
tioning.
The MMSE score involves indications of recall, orienta-
tion, registration, attention, language, and construction.
Scale scores range from 0 to 30. Higher scores on the
MMSE indicate better cognitive performance. At T
 
1
 
, Cron-
bach’s alpha was .69 and at T
 
3
 
, Cronbach’s alpha was .61.
Although the alpha we observed is low for a 23-item scale,
it is comparable to alphas found in other population-based
surveys. Moreover, the MMSE is judged to assess the sever-
ity of cognitive impairment and cognitive changes satisfac-
torily (Tombaugh & McIntyre, 1992).
The 15 Words Test (Saan & Deelman, 1986), derived
from the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1964), was
chosen for the assessment of immediate recall and learning.
The procedure started with a verbal presentation by the in-
terviewer of 15 words. Immediately after the presentation,
the respondent was asked to repeat as many words as possi-
ble. The same procedure took place three times, using the
same 15 words, to obtain an indication of immediate recall
(score on the first trial) and learning (average score of the
three trials). Subsequently, for a duration of approximately
20 min, the respondent performed a different nonverbal
task. After this, the respondent was asked to recall as many
words as possible of the 15 Words Test, to obtain an indica-
tion of the delayed recall function. The respondent was not
prepared for this last trial. For the subsequent cycles, paral-
lel versions of the 15 listed words were used. The different
words of the parallel versions are comparable with respect
to the frequency of daily occurrence, number of syllables,
the stage of life at which they are acquired, and mental im-
agery. As in many tests involving learning (Lezak, 1995),
possible practice effects were observed in the 15 Words
Test. Practice effects may have been due to the fact that re-
spondents remembered the delayed recall test, for which
they were unprepared at the first measurement cycle. They
may therefore have listened more carefully to the words
during the third measurement, which resulted in a better
overall score. For this reason we used only those indicators
of memory performance in our study that showed no or only
small mean improvement. The scores on the 15 Words Test
consisted of the number of words correctly remembered per
trial, resulting in a score range of 0 to 15 for each attempt.
The scores on the immediate recall ranged from 0 to 12. The
scores on learning ranged from 0 to 14. The bivariate corre-
lation of the score on the first trial at T
 
1
 
 and the score on the
first trial at T
 
3
 
 was .44. The bivariate correlation for the sec-
ond trial was .53, and, for the third trial, .54.
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven,
& Court, 1995) was used to measure 
 
fluid intelligence
 
, or
the ability to deal with essentially new information. In pilot
studies a high correlation was observed between the sum
score of the total test and the sum score of Tests A and B
(.96). To save time in the interview, Set Ab was not in-
cluded in this study. Sets A and B each consisted of 12
pages, each page displaying a different pattern, from which
one section was missing. At the bottom of each page, six
patterns were printed, and the respondent was asked to
choose which of these six patterns best fitted into the miss-
ing section. The test score was the number of correctly cho-
sen patterns and ranged from 0 to 24. At T
 
1
 
, the internal
consistency calculated for ordinal variables (KR 20) was
.97, and at T
 
3
 
 KR 20 was .96.
An adaptation of the Coding Task (Savage, 1984) was
used to assess information-processing speed. The respon-
dents were presented a sheet on which rows of characters
were printed. They were asked to name the character that
belongs underneath the printed characters, and to work as
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Figure 1. Cross-lagged regression model (full model). The 16 di-
rect effects (gammas) of the exogenous variables age, gender, level of
education, and functional ability on the latent variables leisure activity
and cognitive function at Time 1 (T1) and Time 3 (T3) are not shown
in the figure.
 
quickly and accurately as possible. The correct letter combi-
nation could be read at the top of the page. This was re-
peated in three trials of 1 min each. The score for each trial
of the Coding Task consisted of the number of completed
combinations. Scores on the first trial were used because of
its lowest rate of nonresponse.
 
Procedure
 
To overcome problems of reversed causation and confound-
ing variables in research on causality, it is recommended to
use a linear structural equations approach, which includes
reversed effects and confounding variables, as well as a
measurement model to account for errors in the measure-
ment (Zapf, Dormann, & Frese, 1996). Accordingly, we ap-
plied a cross-lagged regression model (Bynner, 1994) as in
Figure 1 (full model) to evaluate our hypotheses. Observed
variables are enclosed in boxes; latent variables, in ellipses.
Figure 1 shows that we estimated cross-lagged effects
(shown with straight one-way arrows) from the latent vari-
able everyday activity at T
 
1
 
 on cognitive performance at T
 
3
 
(
 

 
41
 
) and from cognitive performance at T
 
1
 
 on everyday ac-
tivity at T
 
3
 
 (
 

 
32
 
). The figure further shows the lagged effects
of baseline activity on activity at T
 
3
 
 (
 

 
31
 
) and the effect of
baseline cognitive performance on cognitive performance at
T
 
3
 
 (
 

 
42
 
). In accordance with MacCallum and colleagues
(1993), we allowed for residual correlations (shown as
curved two-way arrows) among the latent variables at T
 
1
(	21) and among the latent variables at T3 (	43) to control
for the effect of unknown confounding variables. The error
terms of the indicators of the latent variables social and ex-
periential activity were allowed to correlate over time. No
correlated error terms for the single-indicator latent vari-
ables (all cognitive variables and developmental activity)
were modeled. The error terms of the single indicators were
fixed at a specific value to account for the unreliability of
the measures (Bollen, 1989; Hayduk, 1987). The fixed val-
ues were determined by multiplying the proportion of error
variance (1  
) of the indicator by the variance of the indi-
cator. Reliability was based on Cronbach’s alpha (MMSE),
KR 20 (fluid intelligence), and test–retest reliability (imme-
diate recall, learning, and information-processing speed).
For developmental activity no such reliability measure was
available. We therefore made an arbitrary decision about the
amount of error variance for the indicator, on the basis of
the idea that attending a course does not perfectly measure
cognitively demanding activities. We decided to fix the er-
ror variance for attending a course at 30%, which seems a
reasonable guess compared with other estimated error vari-
ances in the models. Apart from these effects, the direct ef-
fects (gammas) from the exogenous variables age, gender,
level of education, and functional ability on the latent vari-
ables (cognition and activity) at T1 and T3 were estimated
(arrows not shown in the figure). All effects were stan-
dardized.
The right time interval for causality to show up, however,
is highly dependent on the characteristics of the relation-
ships. For example, when the relation between cognitive
functioning and everyday activity is synchronous, that is,
the reaction occurs almost immediately after “exposure,”
then a time interval of 6 years may be too long. To investi-
gate this possibility, we tested another type of model (see
Figure 2) in which the correlation of error terms between
the latent variables everyday activity and cognition at T1
was replaced by two direct cross-sectional effects, all other
effects being equal.
The cross-lagged regression models were evaluated using
the LISREL8 program. Observations with missing values
on any of the variables in one model were excluded, result-
ing in different numbers of observations across the models.
Each combination of one cognitive function and one type of
everyday activity was tested in a separate model, resulting
in 15 (3  5) different models.
The model shown in Figure 1 was applied to all combina-
tions of cognitive functions and everyday activity, varying
only the two cross-lagged effects between the endogenous
latent variables everyday activity and cognitive perfor-
Figure 2. Cross-sectional regression model, error correlates of the
latent variables replaced by two direct cross-sectional effects at Time
1 (T1). The 16 direct effects (gammas) of the exogenous variables age,
gender, level of education, and functional ability on the latent vari-
ables leisure activity and cognitive function at Time 1 (T1) and Time 3
(T3) are not shown in the figure.
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mance. This procedure was repeated for the model in Figure
2. Each model was estimated with a step-wise procedure
starting with an empty model, which is the full model with-
out the cross-lagged effects 41 and 32 (see Figure 1) and
cross-sectional effects 21 and 12 (see Figure 2). Subse-
quently, when it became necessary to obtain a fitting model,
we tested both cross-lagged effects separately, as well as
their joint effect within one model. As having too many ef-
fects included in one model may result in capitalization on
chance (overidentification), we selected the most parsimo-
nious model that still fit the data. The significance of the be-
tas was tested by inspection of the t values and by evaluat-
ing several indicators of fit of the total model, on the basis
of criteria described by Jaccard and Wan (1996). When both
cross-lagged, or cross-sectional, effects appeared to be sig-
nificant, predominance of one of the two effects was tested
by imposing equality constraints on the betas. When equal-
ity constraints on the cross-lagged, or cross-sectional effects
resulted in an unacceptable fit of the model, we concluded
that the effect with the highest beta was predominant.
RESULTS
In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of all the variables
used in the analyses are presented. On average, decline of
cognitive functioning was found for the MMSE and in im-
mediate recall, fluid intelligence, and information-process-
ing speed, but not in learning. There was a decrease in the
frequency of activities over a time period of 6 years for
most of the everyday activities. However, visiting an associ-
ation for helping older adults did not change.
The estimated gammas reflecting the effects of the exog-
enous variables on the latent variables revealed that age sig-
nificantly affects social and developmental activity at T1
(  .10 and .20, respectively). At T3 all types of activ-
ity were negatively affected by age (  .30 for social
activity, .20 for experiential activity, and .15 for de-
velopmental activity). Cognitive functioning was nega-
tively affected by age at both time points (ranging from
.22 to .44). Gender was positively related to everyday
activities (ranging from .06 to .18), indicating that women
have a higher level of activity. Women had higher scores on
cognitive functioning (ranging from .07 to .35), fluid intelli-
gence excepted. Level of education positively affected ex-
periential activity and developmental activity (.48 and .21,
respectively), but not social activity. A higher level of edu-
cation was related to higher levels of cognitive functioning
(ranging from .26 to .40). Functional ability was positively
related to all cognitive functions (ranging from .07 to .19)
and experiential activity (.15), indicating that better health
was related to higher levels of cognitive functioning and
higher levels of everyday activity. Social and developmen-
tal activity were not related to functional ability.
The bivariate correlations among all variables by type of
activity are presented in Tables 2–4. According to the first-
order correlations for the single indicators, there is almost
no association between the indicators of social activity and
cognitive functioning (see Table 2). Correlations ranged
from .06 to .09. However, indicators of experiential (see
Table 3) and developmental activity (see Table 4) correlated
positively with cognitive functioning (at T1 .07 to .21 and .14
to .28, respectively). The next step was to test whether these
correlations are sustained when all the other variables as-
sumed to be associated with these relations are controlled for.
The estimates of the lagged and cross-lagged effects,
along with the indicators of fit of the models, are presented
in Table 5. According to the fit statistics, good fitting mod-
els were found. Strong lagged effects (31 and 42) were ob-
served, immediate recall and developmental activity ex-
cepted, indicating that activity and cognitive functioning
remained fairly stable over the 6 years under study.
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Between the Exogenous Variables, the Cognitive Variables, and the Indicators of Social Activity 
at T1 and T3 (n  1126)
Social Activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Age —
2. Sex .02 —
3. Level of education .10 .24 —
4. Functional ability score .25 .17 .10 —
5. MMSE score (T1) .21 .04 .30 .16 —
6. Immediate recall (T1) .25 .13 .22 .15 .26 —
7. Learning (T1) .30 .22 .22 .14 .32 .80 —
8. Fluid intelligence (T1) .28 .09 .35 .18 .42 .26 .30 —
9. Information-processing speed (T1) .34 .00 .40 .19 .42 .30 .39 .48 —
10. Church attendance (T1) .03 .03 .02 .03 .02 .04 .04 .02 .06 —
11. Neighborhood association (T1) .05 .06 .00 .02 .01 .01 .02 .04 .00 .05 —
12. Helping elderly (T1) .11 .07 .02 .06 .05 .05 .05 .06 .09 .20 .03 —
13. MMSE score (T3) .32 .01 .30 .28 .51 .32 .29 .40 .49 .00 .03 .07 —
14. Immediate recall (T3) .30 .11 .23 .12 .28 .41 .47 .32 .34 .05 .00 .06 .37 —
15. Learning (T3) .40 .19 .22 .15 .30 .47 .59 .34 .40 .05 .01 .08 .46 .86 —
16. Fluid intelligence (T3) .39 .08 .34 .20 .38 .27 .32 .62 .48 .08 .03 .03 .43 .29 .36 —
17. Information-processing speed (T3) .42 .00 .39 .21 .44 .32 .41 .49 .78 .05 .01 .08 .53 .43 .51 .52 —
18. Church attendance (T3) .08 .05 .01 .02 .03 .03 .02 .01 .04 .56 .03 .17 .03 .11 .11 .01 .02 —
19. Neighborhood association (T3) .09 .06 .02 .05 .02 .01 .01 .03 .03 .05 .32 .03 .01 .02 .03 .01 .00 .09 —
20. Helping elderly (T3) .17 .09 .04 .04 .04 .09 .10 .07 .04 .13 .03 .29 .07 .05 .09 .06 .07 .17 .04 —
Notes: Missing cases are deleted per type of activity. MMSE  Mini-Mental State Exam.
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Hypothesis 1 specified that positive cross-lagged effects
are to be expected from everyday activities on cognitive
functioning over time. With respect to this hypothesis, the
cross-lagged effects 41 were considered. None of the 15
possible cross-lagged effects of everyday activity on cogni-
tion reached the level of significance, suggesting that there
is no cross-lagged effect of the level of everyday activity on
cognitive functioning over a time period of 6 years. We re-
jected the first hypothesis.
Our competing hypothesis stated that positive cross-
lagged effects are to be expected of cognitive functioning on
everyday activities, at least for activities that can be viewed
as being cognitively demanding. With respect to this hy-
pothesis, the cross-lagged effects 32 were considered. In
one of the five models involving developmental activity,
which is viewed as a cognitively demanding activity, a pos-
itive cross-lagged effect (  .14) of cognitive functioning
on developmental activity was observed. We may conclude
that with respect to information-processing speed the com-
peting hypothesis should not be rejected. However, no evi-
dence was found for other aspects of cognitive functioning.
Hypothesis 2 specified that developmental activity and so-
cial activity enhance cognitive performance. However, as we
observed already, no cross-lagged effects were present. Thus,
the expected positive effects of social and developmental ac-
tivity on cognitive functioning are clearly not supported by
the data. We therefore rejected our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 focused on the extent to which cognitive
functions are differently affected by everyday activities and
whether information-processing speed was more predictive
Table 3. Bivariate Correlations Between the Exogenous Variables, the Cognitive Variables, and the Indicators 
of Experiential Activity at T1 and T3
Experiential Activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Age —
2. Gender .02 —
3. Level of education .10 .24 —
4. Functional ability score .25 .17 .10 —
5. MMSE score (T1) .21 .04 .30 .16 —
6. Immediate recall (T1) .25 .13 .22 .15 .26 —
7. Learning (T1) .30 .22 .22 .14 .32 .80 —
8. Fluid intelligence (T1) .28 .09 .35 .18 .42 .26 .30 —
9. Information-processing speed (T1) .34 .00 .40 .19 .42 .30 .39 .48 —
10. Visiting cultural institution (T1) .02 .04 .37 .09 .21 .18 .17 .20 .24 —
11. Trip to forest, dunes, etc. (T1) .11 .10 .12 .15 .11 .10 .07 .12 .16 .23 —
12. Visiting cafe or restaurant (T1) .01 .07 .20 .11 .09 .09 .07 .13 .15 .30 .26 —
13. MMSE score (T3) .32 .04 .30 .21 .51 .32 .39 .40 .49 .18 .16 .10 —
14. Immediate recall (T3) .30 .11 .23 .12 .28 .41 .47 .32 .34 .19 .06 .09 .37 —
15. Learning (T3) .40 .19 .22 .15 .30 .47 .59 .34 .40 .18 .06 .06 .46 .86 —
16. Fluid intelligence (T3) .39 .08 .34 .20 .38 .27 .32 .62 .48 .16 .14 .14 .43 .29 .36 —
17. Information-processing speed (T3) .42 .00 .39 .21 .44 .32 .41 .49 .78 .24 .13 .15 .53 .43 .51 .52 —
18. Visiting cultural institution (T3) .14 .05 .35 .10 .16 .16 .17 .21 .26 .60 .17 .22 .20 .20 .21 .20 .29 —
19. Trip to forest, dunes, etc. (T3) .19 .10 .10 .14 .09 .08 .08 .13 .14 .22 .38 .15 .17 .11 .11 .17 .20 .30 —
20. Visiting cafe or restaurant (T3) .12 .05 .24 .11 .14 .11 .10 .18 .17 .26 .23 .52 .12 .12 .11 .19 .20 .26 .27 —
Notes: n  1126. MMSE  Mini-Mental State Exam.
Table 4. Bivariate Correlations Between the Exogenous Variables, the Cognitive Variables, and the Indicators 
of Developmental Activity at T1 and T3
Developmental Activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Age —
2. Gender .02 —
3. Level of education .10 .24 —
4. Functional ability score .25 .17 .10 —
5. MMSE score (T1) .21 .05 .30 .16 —
6. Immediate recall (T1) .25 .13 .22 .15 .26 —
7. Learning (T1) .30 .22 .22 .14 .32 .80 —
8. Fluid intelligence (T1) .28 .09 .35 .18 .42 .26 .30 —
9. Information-processing speed (T1) .34 .00 .40 .19 .42 .30 .39 .48 —
10. Study or educational course (T1) .19 .08 .20 .09 .18 .18 .21 .14 .20 —
11. MMSE score (T3) .32 .04 .30 .21 .51 .32 .39 .40 .49 .17 —
12. Immediate recall (T3) .29 .11 .23 .12 .28 .41 .47 .32 .34 .16 .37 —
13. Learning (T3) .40 .19 .22 .15 .30 .47 .59 .34 .40 .20 .45 .86 —
14. Fluid intelligence (T3) .39 .08 .34 .20 .38 .27 .32 .62 .48 .14 .43 .29 .36 —
15. Information-processing speed (T3) .42 .00 .39 .21 .44 .32 .41 .49 .78 .21 .53 .43 .51 .52 —
16. Study or educational course (T3) .15 .04 .17 .07 .13 .08 .14 .14 .22 .30 .16 .12 .15 .15 .23 —
Notes: n  1125. MMSE  Mini-Mental State Exam.
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of everyday activity than other cognitive functions. It was
expected that, of the distinguished cognitive functions, in-
formation-processing speed would be least affected by ev-
eryday activities and would have the largest effect on every-
day activities. The first part of this hypothesis was already
rejected, and we therefore focused on the last part of the hy-
pothesis, stating that information-processing speed has the
largest effect on everyday activities. We observed a positive
effect (.14) of information-processing speed on develop-
mental activity, which is in line with our hypothesis.
None of our expectations were supported by the data, ex-
cept for the effect of speed on developmental activity. One
of the reasons for a lack of significant effects may be the
length of the time lag. We therefore applied the second
model (from Figure 2), in which the error correlation be-
tween the latent variables everyday activity and cognitive
function was replaced by two direct effects (12 and 21) to
test for a possible synchronous effect between everyday ac-
tivities and cognitive functions. The results of the additional
analyses indicated that the idea of synchronicity does not
hold. None of the cross-sectional effects at T1 were signifi-
cant.
In sum, our study could not provide evidence about a
causal effect of everyday activities on cognitive functioning
or the other way around. The only effect found (i.e., the ef-
fect of information-processing speed on developmental ac-
tivity) is in favor of the reversed causal hypothesis, stating
that respondents with good cognitive functioning prefer
cognitively demanding activities. One of the reasons for
these small effects compared with other studies in this field
may be that we controlled for the effect of unknown con-
founding variables. Without such a control, the relation be-
tween level of activity and cognitive functioning observed
in other studies may be the result of spurious relationships.
To illustrate that these effects can be observed, we removed
the error correlations between the latent variables at T1 and
T3 and reanalyzed all 15 models. This revealed additional
significant cross-lagged effects from experiential activities
on MMSE (.08), immediate recall (.12), and information-
processing speed (.06), and one from social activity on
learning (.09). These four effects suggest that everyday ac-
tivities enhance cognitive functioning over time. However,
as these effects are the result of fixing the residual correla-
tion at T1 (	12) and T3 (	34), they reflect spurious effects. A
fifth cross-lagged effect (.06) appeared for MMSE on devel-
opmental activity, which seems to confirm that the reversed
causal direction is also a spurious effect.
DISCUSSION
The present longitudinal study focused on the causal effects
between everyday activities and cognitive performance in a
large population-based sample of older adults. We found lit-
tle evidence of either of the causal effects. None of the ac-
tivities were found to enhance cognitive functioning 6 years
later when we controlled for age, gender, level of education,
and health, as well as for unknown confounding variables.
Conversely, one cognitive function (i.e., information-pro-
cessing speed) appeared to affect developmental activity.
Before discussing our findings, we address some limitations
in our study design.
Table 5. Fit Statistics and Standardized Regression Effects of the 15 Cross-Lagged Models, Controlling for Age, Gender, Level of 
Education, and Functional Ability
 Lagged
Cross-
Lagged
Cross-
Sectional Fit Statistics
Model Variables na 31 42 41 32 21 12 2 (df) RMSEA sRMR GFI CFI
Social Activity
MMSE 1693 .74 .68 58.21 (31) .02 .02 .99 .99
Immediate recall 1186 .73 .47 57.17 (31) .03 .03 .99 .99
Learning 1187 .73 .74 59.70 (31) .03 .03 .99 .99
Fluid intelligence 1639 .76 .53 57.17 (31) .02 .02 .99 .99
Information-processing 
speed 1152 .76 .82 53.62 (31) .03 .03 .99 .99
Experiential Activity
MMSE 1697 .71 .67 163.90 (31) .05 .03 .98 .97
Immediate recall 1185 .73 .48 142.16 (31) .05 .04 .98 .96
Learning 1186 .73 .74 135.62 (31) .05 .04 .98 .97
Fluid intelligence 1644 .71 .53 164.41 (31) .05 .03 .98 .97
Information-processing 
speed 1153 .72 .81 129.02 (31) .05 .03 .98 .97
Developmental Activity
MMSE 1697 .40 .67 1.83 (2) .00 .00 1.00 1.00
Immediate recall 1185 .37 .48 1.88 (2) .00 .01 1.00 1.00
Learning 1186 .38 .74 0.19 (2) .00 .00 1.00 1.00
Fluid intelligence 1644 .41 .53 1.54 (2) .00 .00 1.00 1.00
Information-processing 
speed 1153 .36 .81 .14 0.82 (1) .00 .00 1.00 1.00
Notes: MMSE  Mini-Mental State Exam; RMSEA  root mean square error of approximation; sRMR  standardized root mean square residual; GFI  good-
ness-of-fit index; CFI  comparative fit index.
aDifferences in ns are mainly caused by the exclusion of most of the respondents born between 1931 and 1937 at follow up from measures of learning, immediate
recall, and information-processing speed.
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One of the problems we encountered was that attrition
has been selective, leaving a relatively younger sample of
respondents. However, because of an over-sampling of men
and older persons at baseline, the final sample still showed
sufficient variability in the study variables, which alleviated
the biasing influence of attrition. Furthermore, a study pe-
riod of 6 years may be too short to demonstrate substantial
effects between everyday activities and cognitive function-
ing. However, increasing the study period undeniably en-
larges the biasing impact of selective attrition of respon-
dents. Moreover, the fact that the stability of both cognitive
functions and everyday activities was rather high further
limited the possibility of finding substantial cross-lagged ef-
fects. Finally, only one activity supposed to be cognitively
demanding, namely, following a course or study, was in-
cluded in the analysis. Although this indicator is considered
an outstanding example of a cognitively demanding activ-
ity, the selection of other cognitively demanding variables
may have yielded different results.
Although several studies report positive effects of an ac-
tive lifestyle on cognitive functioning, our study did not
provide evidence for this supposed causality. Regarding the
type of cognitive function affected, our findings do not con-
tradict the results reported by Gold and colleagues (1995),
as they only found positive effects on crystallized intelli-
gence, and not on indicators of fluid intelligence, which
were the only cognitive functions we selected in our study.
In the study of Hultsch and colleagues (1999), positive ef-
fects of novel information processing and change in infor-
mation processing were found on working memory, which
has a fluid component. However, as working memory was
reported to have a high loading on fact recall (.89), which
has a crystallized component, we suggest that the positive
findings reported by Hultsch and colleagues may be valid
for crystallized intelligence, but not for fluid intelligence.
The positive effects of experiential activities on cognitive
functions that we found as a result of removing the error
correlates between the latent variables cognition and activ-
ity point toward the existence of an underlying concept that
causes spurious relations between experiential activities and
maintenance of cognitive functioning. As this concept is not
further specified, we can only speculate on its nature. How-
ever, the positive correlation between experiential activities
and level of education (see Table 3) makes it likely that this
concept has much in common with SES. SES is not only re-
lated to cognitive functioning, but also to specific activities
(Ganzeboom, 1989). The partial support for our hypothesis
stating that respondents with good cognitive functioning en-
gage in activities that are cognitively demanding is in line
with this suggestion. SES is related to a variety of living
conditions and lifestyles (Bond & Coleman, 1993), such as
drinking and smoking behavior and involvement in sports
(Tuinstra, Groothoff, Van den Heuvel, & Post, 1998). It is
found that higher SES decreases the risk of functional de-
cline during later life (Boult, Kane, Louis, Boult, & McCaf-
frey, 1994). Analogous to this finding, a cumulative effect
of living conditions and lifestyles over the life course on
cognitive decline could exist. In sum, we suggest that not
the activity in itself, but rather specific lifestyles and living
conditions to which the types of activities engaged in are
closely connected, may in fact be responsible for the posi-
tive relation between specific activities and cognitive func-
tioning.
The positive effect of information-processing speed on
developmental activity indicates that our study is mostly in
favor of Hultsch and colleagues (1999), who stated that
high-ability people lead intellectually active lives. Whether
or not decline in cognitive functions results in the limitation
of activities remains an open question.
Further research on the relation between activities and
maintenance of cognitive functioning may benefit from a
focus on different aspects of living conditions and lifestyles.
Therefore, although Lawton’s categorization based on the
meaning of the activity (Lawton, 1993) facilitated a selec-
tion of various types of everyday activities, our results indi-
cate that a more fruitful categorization may focus on living
conditions and lifestyle. This may shed new light on the un-
derlying mechanisms related to changes of cognitive func-
tioning in old age.
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